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Abstract. In this paper we present two related-key attacks on the full
AES. For AES-256 we show the ﬁrst key recovery attack that works for
all the keys and has 299.5 time and data complexity, while the recent
attack by Biryukov-Khovratovich-Nikolic´ works for a weak key class and
has much higher complexity. The second attack is the ﬁrst cryptanalysis
of the full AES-192. Both our attacks are boomerang attacks, which are
based on the recent idea of ﬁnding local collisions in block ciphers and
enhanced with the boomerang switching techniques to gain free rounds
in the middle.
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The extended version of this paper is available at
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1 Introduction
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [9] — a 128-bit block cipher, is one
of the most popular ciphers in the world and is widely used for both commercial
and government purposes. It has three variants which oﬀer diﬀerent security
levels based on the length of the secret key: 128, 192, 256-bits. Since it became
a standard in 2001 [1], the progress in its cryptanalysis has been very slow. The
best results until 2009 were attacks on 7-round AES-128 [10,11], 10-round AES-
192 [5,13], 10-round AES-256 [5,13] out of 10, 12 and 14 rounds respectively.
The two last results are in the related-key scenario.
Only recently there was announced a ﬁrst attack on the full AES-256 [6]. The
authors showed a related-key attack which works with complexity 296 for one
out of every 235 keys. They have also shown practical attacks on AES-256 (see
also [7]) in the chosen key scenario, which demonstrates that AES-256 can not
serve as a replacement for an ideal cipher in theoretically sound constructions
such as Davies-Meyer mode.
In this paper we improve these results and present the ﬁrst related-key attack
on AES-256 that works for all the keys and has a better complexity (299.5 data
and time). We also develop the ﬁrst related key attack on the full AES-192.
In both attacks we minimize the number of active S-boxes in the key-schedule
(which caused the previous attack on AES-256 to work only for a fraction of all
M. Matsui (Ed.): ASIACRYPT 2009, LNCS 5912, pp. 1–18, 2009.
c© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2009
2 A. Biryukov and D. Khovratovich
Table 1. Best attacks on AES-192 and AES-256
Attack Rounds # keys Data Time Memory Source
192
Partial sums 8 1 2127.9 2188 ? [10]
Related-key rectangle 10 64 2124 2183 ? [5,13]
Related-key
ampliﬁed boomerang
12 4 2123 2176 2152 Sec. 6
256
Partial sums 9 256 285 2226 232 [10]
Related-key rectangle 10 64 2114 2173 ? [5,13]
Related-key diﬀerential 14 235 2131 2131 265 [6]
Related-key boomerang 14 4 299.5 299.5 277 Sec. 5
keys) by using a boomerang attack [15] enhanced with boomerang switching tech-
niques. We ﬁnd our boomerang diﬀerentials by searching for local collisions [8,6]
in a cipher. The complexities of our attacks and a comparison with the best
previous attacks are given in Table 1.
This paper is structured as follows: In Section 3 we develop the idea of local
collisions in the cipher and show how to construct optimal related-key diﬀeren-
tials for AES-192 and AES-256 . In Section 4 we brieﬂy explain the idea of a
boomerang and an ampliﬁed boomerang attack. In Sections 5 and 6 we describe
an attack on AES-256 and AES-192, respectively.
2 AES Description and Notation
We expect that most of our readers are familiar with the description of AES and
thus point out only the main features of AES-256 that are crucial for our attack.
AES rounds are numbered from 1 to 14 (12 for AES-192). We denote the i-th
192-bit subkey (do not confuse with a 128-bit round key) by Ki, i.e. the ﬁrst
(whitening) subkey is the ﬁrst four columns of K0. The last subkey is K7 in
AES-256 and K8 in AES-192. The diﬀerence in Ki is denoted by ΔKi. Bytes
of a subkey are denoted by kli,j , where i, j stand for the row and column index,
respectively, in the standard matrix representation of AES, and l stands for the
number of the subkey. Bytes of the plaintext are denoted by pi,j , and bytes of the
internal state after the SubBytes transformation in round r are denoted by ari,j ,
with Ar depicting the whole state. Let us also denote by bri,j byte in position
(i, j) after the r-th application of MixColumns.
Features of AES-256. AES-256 has 14 rounds and a 256-bit key, which is two
times larger than the internal state. Thus the key schedule consists of only 7
rounds. One key schedule round consists of the following transformations:
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kl+1i,0 ← S(kli+1,7)⊕ kli,0 ⊕ Cl, 0 ≤ i ≤ 3;
kl+1i,j ← kl+1i,j−1 ⊕ kli,j , 0 ≤ i ≤ 3, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3;
kl+1i,4 ← S(kl+1i,3 )⊕ kli,4, 0 ≤ i ≤ 3;
kl+1i,j ← kl+1i,j−1 ⊕ kli,j , 0 ≤ i ≤ 3, 5 ≤ j ≤ 7,
where S() stands for the S-box, and Cl — for the round-dependent constant.
Therefore, each round has 8 S-boxes.
Features of AES-192. AES-192 has 12 rounds and a 192-bit key, which is 1.5
times larger than the internal state. Thus the key schedule consists of 8 rounds.
One key schedule round consists of the following transformations:
kl+1i,0 ← S(kli+1,5)⊕ kli,0 ⊕ Cl, 0 ≤ i ≤ 3;
kl+1i,j ← kl+1i,j−1 ⊕ kli,j , 0 ≤ i ≤ 3, 1 ≤ j ≤ 5.
Notice that each round has only four S-boxes.








Fig. 1. A local collision in AES-256
The notion of a local collision comes from
the cryptanalysis of hash functions with
one of the ﬁrst applications by Chabaud
and Joux [8]. The idea is to inject a dif-
ference into the internal state, causing a
disturbance, and then to correct it with
the next injections. The resulting diﬀer-
ence pattern is spread out due to the mes-
sage schedule causing more disturbances
in other rounds. The goal is to have as
few disturbances as possible in order to
reduce the complexity of the attack.
In the related-key scenario we are al-
lowed to have diﬀerence in the key, and
not only in the plaintext as in the pure
diﬀerential cryptanalysis. However the
attacker can not control the key itself and
thus the attack should work for any key
pair with a given diﬀerence.
Local collisions inAES-256 are best understood on a one-roundexample (Fig. 1),
which has one active S-box in the internal state, and ﬁve non-zero byte diﬀerences
in the two consecutive subkeys. This diﬀerential holds with probability 2−6 if we
use an optimal diﬀerential for an S-box:





















Due to the key schedule the diﬀerences spread to other subkeys thus forming
the key schedule diﬀerence. The resulting key schedule diﬀerence can be viewed
as a set of local collisions, where the expansion of the disturbance (also called
disturbance vector) and the correction diﬀerences compensate each other. The
probability of the full diﬀerential trail is then determined by the number of
active S-boxes in the key-schedule and in the internal state. The latter is just
the number of the non-zero bytes in the disturbance vector.
Therefore, to construct an optimal trail we have to construct a minimal-weight
disturbance expansion, which will become a part of the full key schedule diﬀer-
ence. For the AES key schedule, which is mostly linear, this task can be viewed
as building a low-weight codeword of a linear code. Simultaneously, correction
diﬀerences also form a codeword, and the key schedule diﬀerence codeword is
the sum of the disturbance and the correction codewords. In the simplest trail
the correction codeword is constructed from the former one by just shifting four
columns to the right and applying the S-box–MixColumns transformation.
An example of a good key-schedule pattern for AES-256 is depicted in Figure 2
as a 4.5-round codeword. In the ﬁrst four key-schedule rounds the disturbance
codeword has only 9 active bytes (red cells in the picture), which is the lower
bound. We want to avoid active S-boxes in the key schedule as long as possible,
so we start with a single-byte diﬀerence in byte k40,0 and go backwards. Due to
a slow diﬀusion in the AES key schedule the diﬀerence aﬀects only one more
byte per key schedule round. The correction (grey) column should be positioned
four columns to the right, and propagates backwards in the same way. The last
column in the ﬁrst subkey is active, so all S-boxes of the ﬁrst round are active
as well, which causes an unknown diﬀerence in the ﬁrst (green) column. This






Fig. 2. Full key schedule diﬀerence (4.5 key-schedule rounds) for AES-256
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4 Related Key Boomerang and Amplified Boomerang
Attacks
In this section we describe two types of boomerang attacks in the related-key
scenario.
A basic boomerang distinguisher [15] is applied to a cipher EK(·) which is
considered as a composition of two sub-ciphers: EK(·) = E1 ◦E0. The ﬁrst sub-
cipher is supposed to have a diﬀerential α → β, and the second one to have a
diﬀerential γ → δ, with probabilities p and q, respectively. In the further text
the diﬀerential trails of E0 and E1 are called upper and lower trails, respectively.
In the boomerang attack a plaintext pair results in a quartet with probability
p2q2. The ampliﬁed boomerang attack [12] (also called rectangle attack [4]) works
in a chosen-plaintext scenario and constructs N2p2q22−n quartets of N plaintext
pairs. We refer to [15,12] for the full description of the attacks.
In the original boomerang attack paper by Wagner [15] it was noted that
the number of good ciphertext quartets is actually higher, since an attacker may
consider other β and γ (with the same α and δ). This observation can be applied
to both types of boomerang attacks. As a result, the number Q of good quartets






P [α→ β]2; qˆ =
√∑
γ
P [γ → δ]2. (1)
4.1 Related-Key Attack Model
The related-key attack model [3] is a class of cryptanalytic attacks in which the
attacker knows or chooses a relation between several keys and is given access to
encryption/decryption functions with all these keys. The goal of the attacker is
to ﬁnd the actual secret keys. The relation between the keys can be an arbitrary
bijective function R (or even a family of such functions) chosen in advance by
the attacker (for a formal treatment of the general related key model see [2,14]).
In the simplest form of this attack, this relation is just a XOR with a constant:
K2 = K1 ⊕ C, where the constant C is chosen by the attacker. This type of
relation allows the attacker to trace the propagation of XOR diﬀerences induced
by the key diﬀerence C through the key schedule of the cipher. However, more
complex forms of this attack allow other (possibly non-linear) relations between
the keys. For example, in some of the attacks described in this paper the attacker
chooses a desired XOR relation in the second subkey, and then deﬁnes the implied
relation between the actual keys as: K2 = F−1(F (K1) ⊕ C) = RC(K1) where
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F represents a single round of the AES-256 key schedule, and the constant C is
chosen by the attacker.1
Compared to other cryptanalytic attacks in which the attacker can manipulate
only the plaintexts and/or the ciphertexts the choice of the relation between
secret keys gives additional degree of freedom to the attacker. The downside of
this freedom is that such attacks might be harder to mount in practice. Still,
designers usually try to build “ideal” primitives which can be automatically used
without further analysis in the widest possible set of applications, protocols, or
modes of operation. Thus resistance to such attacks is an important design goal
for block ciphers, and in fact it was one of the stated design goals of the Rijndael
algorithm, which was selected as the Advanced Encryption Standard.
In this paper we use boomerang attacks in the related-key scenario. In the
following sections we denote the diﬀerence between subkeys in the upper trail
by ΔKi, and in the lower part by ∇Ki.
4.2 Boomerang Switch
Here we analyze the transition from the sub-trail E0 to the sub-trail E1, which
we call the boomerang switch. We show that the attacker can gain 1-2 middle
rounds for free due to a careful choice of the top and bottom diﬀerentials. The
position of the switch is a tradeoﬀ between the sub-trail probabilities, that should
minimize the overall complexity of the distinguisher. Below we summarize the
switching techniques that can be used in boomerang or ampliﬁed boomerang
attacks on any block cipher.
Ladder switch. By default, a cipher is decomposed into rounds. However, such
decomposition may not be the best for the boomerang attack. We propose
not only to further decompose the round into simple operations but also to
exploit the existing parallelism in these operations. For example some bytes
may be independently processed. In such case we can switch in one byte be-
fore it is transformed and in another one after it is transformed, see Fig. 3 for
an illustration.
An example is our attack on AES-192. Let us look at the diﬀerential trails
(see Fig. 8). There is one active S-box in round 7 of the lower trail in byte
b70,2. On the other hand, the S-box in the same position is not active in the
upper trail. If we would switch after ShiftRows in round 6, we would “pay” the
probability in round 7 afterwards. However, we switch all the state except b0,2
after MixColumns, and switch the remaining byte after the S-box application in
round 7, where it is not active. We thus do not pay for this S-box.
Feistel switch. Surprisingly, a Feistel round with an arbitrary function (e.g., an
S-box) can be passed for free in the boomerang attack (this was ﬁrst observed
in the attack on cipher Khufu in [15]). Suppose the internal state (X , Y ) is
1 Note that due to low nonlinearity of AES-256 key schedule such subkey relation
corresponds to a ﬁxed XOR relation in 28 out of 32 bytes of the secret key, and a
simple S-box relation in the four remaining bytes.








E1E0 / E1 boundary
Fig. 3. The ladder switch in a toy three S-box block. A switch either before or after
the S-box layer would cost probability, while the ladder does not.
transformed to (Z = X ⊕ f(Y ), Y ) at the end of E0. Suppose also that the E0
diﬀerence before this transformation is (ΔX , ΔY ), and that the E1 diﬀerence
after this transformation is (ΔZ , ΔY ).
As a result, variable Y in the four iterations of a boomerang quartet takes two
values: Y0 and Y0 ⊕ΔY for some Y0. Then the f transformation is guaranteed
to have the same output diﬀerence Δf in the quartet. Therefore, the decryption
phase of the boomerang creates the diﬀerence ΔX in X at the end of E0 “for
free”. This trick is used in the switch in the subkey in the attack on AES-192.
S-box switch. This is similar to the Feistel switch, but costs probability only
in one of the directions. Suppose that E0 ends with an S-box Y ⇐ S(X) with
diﬀerence Δ If the output of an S-box in a cipher has diﬀerence Δ and if the same
diﬀerence Δ comes from the lower trail, then propagation through this S-box is
for free on one of the faces of the boomerang. Moreover, the other direction can
use ampliﬁed probability since speciﬁc value of the diﬀerence Δ is not important
for the switch2.
5 Attack on AES-256
In this section we present a related key boomerang attack on AES-256.
5.1 The Trail
The boomerang trail is depicted in Figure 7, and the actual values are listed in
Tables 3 and 2. It consists of two similar 7-round trails: the ﬁrst one covers rounds
2 This type of switch was used in the original version of this paper, but is not needed
now due to change in the trails. We describe it here for completeness, since it might
be useful in other attacks.
8 A. Biryukov and D. Khovratovich
Table 2. Key schedule diﬀerence in the AES-256 trail
ΔKi
0
? 00 00 00 3e 3e 3e 3e
? 01 01 01 ? 21 21 21
? 00 00 00 1f 1f 1f 1f
? 00 00 00 1f 1f 1f 1f
1
00 00 00 00 3e 00 3e 00
00 01 00 01 21 00 21 00
00 00 00 00 1f 00 1f 00
00 00 00 00 1f 00 1f 00
2
00 00 00 00 3e 3e 00 00
00 01 01 00 21 21 00 00
00 00 00 00 1f 1f 00 00
00 00 00 00 1f 1f 00 00
3
00 00 00 00 3e 00 00 00
00 01 00 00 21 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 1f 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 1f 00 00 00
4
00 00 00 00 3e 3e 3e 3e
00 01 01 01 ? ? ? ?
00 00 00 00 1f 1f 1f 1f
00 00 00 00 1f 1f 1f 1f
∇Ki
0
? ? ? ? ? ? ? 00
X X X X 1f 1f 1f 00
? ? ? ? 1f 1f 1f 00
? ? ? ? 21 21 21 00
1
? 01 ? 00 ? ? 00 00
X 00 X 00 1f 1f 00 00
? 00 ? 00 1f 1f 00 00
? 00 ? 00 21 21 00 00
2
? ? 00 00 ? 00 00 00
X X 00 00 1f 00 00 00
? ? 00 00 1f 00 00 00
? ? 00 00 21 00 00 00
3
? 01 01 01 3e 3e 3e 3e
X 00 00 00 1f 1f 1f 1f
? 00 00 00 1f 1f 1f 1f
? 00 00 00 21 21 21 21
4
01 00 01 00 3e 00 3e 00
00 00 00 00 1f 00 1f 00
00 00 00 00 1f 00 1f 00
00 00 00 00 21 00 21 00
5
01 01 00 00 3e 3e 00 00
00 00 00 00 1f 1f 00 00
00 00 00 00 1f 1f 00 00
00 00 00 00 21 21 00 00
6
01 00 00 00 3e 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 1f 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 1f 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 21 00 00 00
7
01 01 01 01 ? ? ? ?
00 00 00 00 1f 1f 1f 1f
00 00 00 00 1f 1f 1f 1f
00 00 00 00 21 21 21 21
1–8, and the second one covers rounds 8–14. The trails diﬀer in the position of
the disturbance bytes: the row 1 in the upper trail, and the row 0 in the lower
trail. This fact allows the Ladder switch.
The switching state is the state A9 (internal state after the SubBytes in round
9) and a special key state KS , which is the concatenation of the last four columns
of K3 and the ﬁrst four columns of K4. Although there are active S-boxes in
the ﬁrst round of the key schedule, we do not impose conditions on them. As a
result, the diﬀerence in column 0 of K0 is unknown yet.
Related Keys. We deﬁne the relation between four keys as follows (see also
Figure 4). For a secret key KA, which the attacker tries to ﬁnd, compute its
second subkey K1A and apply the diﬀerence ΔK
1 to get a subkey K1B, from
which the key KB is computed. The relation between KA and KB is a constant
XOR relation in 28 bytes out of 32 and is computed via a function k′i,0 =
ki,0 ⊕ S(ki+1,7) ⊕ S(ki+1,7 ⊕ ci+1,7), i=0,1,2,3, with constant ci+1,7 = Δk0i+1,7
for the four remaining bytes.
The switch into the keys KC ,KD happens between the 3rd and the 4th sub-
keys in order to avoid active S-boxes in the key-schedule using the Ladder switch
idea described above. We compute subkeys K3 and K4 for both KA and KB.
We add the diﬀerence ∇K3 to K3A and compute the upper half (four columns)
of K3C . Then we add the diﬀerence ∇K4 to K4A and compute the lower half (four
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Table 3. Non-zero internal state diﬀerences in the AES-256 trail
ΔP
? 00 00 00
? ? ? ?
? 00 ? 00
? 00 00 ?
ΔA1
? 00 00 00
1f ? 1f 1f
00 00 ? 00
00 00 00 ?
ΔA3
00 00 00 00
00 1f 00 1f
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
ΔA5
00 00 00 00
00 1f 1f 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
ΔA7
00 00 00 00
00 1f 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
∇A7
1f 1f 1f 1f
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
∇A9
1f 00 1f 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
∇A11
1f 1f 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
∇A13
1f 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
ΔC
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00















Fig. 4. AES-256: Computing KB , KC , and KD from KA
columns) of K4C . From these eight consecutive columns we compute the full KC .
The key KD is computed from KB in the same way.
Finally, we point out that diﬀerence between KC and KD can be computed in
the backward direction deterministically since there would be no active S-boxes
till the ﬁrst round. The secret key KA, and the three keys KB, KC , KD computed
from KA as described above form a proper related key quartet. Moreover, due
to a slow diﬀusion in the backward direction, as a bonus we can compute some
values in ∇Ki even for i = 0, 1, 2, 3 (see Table 2). Hence given the byte value
kli,j for KA we can partly compute KB, KC and KD.
Internal State. The plaintext diﬀerence is speciﬁed in 9 bytes. We require that
all the active S-boxes in the internal state should output the diﬀerence 0x1f so
that the active S-boxes are passed with probability 2−6. The only exception is
the ﬁrst round where the input diﬀerence in nine active bytes is not speciﬁed.
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Let us start a boomerang attack with a random pair of plaintexts that ﬁt the
trail after one round. Active S-boxes in rounds 3–7 are passed with probability
2−6 each, so the overall probability is 2−30.
We switch the internal state in round 9 with the Ladder switch technique:
the row 1 is switched before the application of S-boxes, and the other rows are
switched after the S-box layer. As a result, we do not pay for active S-boxes at
all in this round.
The second part of the boomerang trail is quite simple. Three S-boxes in rounds
10–14 contribute to the probability, which is thus equal to 2−18. Finally we get one
boomerang quartet after the ﬁrst round with probability 2−30−30−18−18 = 2−96.
5.2 The Attack
The attack works as follows. Do the following steps 225.5 times:
1. Prepare a structure of plaintexts as speciﬁed below.
2. Encrypt it on keys KA and KB and keep the resulting sets SA and SB in
memory.
3. XOR ΔC to all the ciphertexts in SA and decrypt the resulting ciphertexts
with KC . Denote the new set of plaintexts by SC .
4. Repeat previous step for the set SB and the key KD. Denote the set of
plaintexts by SD.










6. For every remaining pair check if the diﬀerence in pi,0, i > 1 is equal on both
sides of the boomerang quartet (16-bit ﬁlter). Note that ∇k0i,7 = 0 so Δk0i,0
should be equal for both key pairs (KA,KB) and (KC ,KD).
7. Filter out the quartets whose diﬀerence can not be produced by active S-
boxes in the ﬁrst round (one-bit ﬁlter per S-box per key pair) and active
S-boxes in the key schedule (one-bit ﬁlter per S-box), which is a 2 ·2+2 = 6-
bit ﬁlter.
8. Gradually recover key values and diﬀerences simultaneously ﬁltering out the
wrong quartets.
Each structure has all possible values in column 0 and row 0, and constant values
in the other bytes. Of 272 texts per structure we can compose 2144 ordered
pairs. Of these pairs 2144−8·9 = 272 pass the ﬁrst round. Thus we expect one
right quartet per 296−72 = 224 structures, and three right quartets out of 225.5
structures.
Let us now compute the number of noisy quartets. About 2144−56−16 =
272 pairs come out of step 6. The next step applies a 6-bit ﬁlter, so we get
272+25.5−6 = 291.5 candidate quartets in total.
The remainder of this section deals with gradual recovering of the key and
ﬁltering wrong quartets. The key bytes are recovered as shown in Figure 5.











Fig. 5. Gradual key recovery. Digits stand for the steps, ’D’ means diﬀerence.
1. First, consider 4-tuples of related key bytes in each position (1, j), j < 4. Two
diﬀerences in a tuple are known by default. The third diﬀerence is unknown
but is equal for all tuples (see Table 2, where it is denoted by X) and gets
one of 27 values. We use this fact for key derivation and ﬁltering as follows.
Consider key bytes k02,2 and k
0
2,3. The candidate quartet proposes 2
2 candi-
dates for both 4-tuples of related-key bytes, or 24 candidates in total. Since
the diﬀerences are related with the X-diﬀerence, which is a 9-bit ﬁlter, this
step reveals two key bytes and the value of X and reduces the number of
quartets to 291.5−5 = 286.5.
2. Now consider the value of Δk01,0, which is unknown yet and might be diﬀerent
in two pairs of related keys. Let us notice that it is determined by the value of
k02,7, and ∇k02,7 = 0, so that Δk01,0 is the same for both related key pairs and
can take 27 values. Each guess of Δk01,0 proposes key candidates for byte
k02,0, where we have a 8-bit ﬁlter for the 4-tuple of related-key bytes. We
thus derive the value of k01,0 in all keys and reduce the number of candidate
quartets to 285.5.
3. The same trick holds for the unknown Δk01,4, which can get 2
7 possible values
and can be computed for both key pairs simultaneously. Each of these values
proposes four candidates for k01,1, which are ﬁltered with an 8-bit ﬁlter. We
thus recover k01,1 and Δk
0
1,4 and reduce the number of quartets to 2
79.5.









and k02,7. There are at most two candidates for the latter value as well as for
Δk01,4, so we get a 6-bit ﬁlter and reduce the number of quartets to 2
72.5.
5. Each quartet also proposes two candidates for each of key bytes k00,0, k
0
2,2,
and k03,3. Totally, the number of key candidates proposed by each quartet
is 26.
The key candidates are proposed for 11 bytes of each of four related keys. How-
ever, these bytes are strongly related so the number of independent key bytes on







3,3 of KA and KC are independent so we recover 15 key
bytes with 278.5 proposals. The probability that three wrong quartets propose
the same candidates does not exceed 2−80.
We thus estimate the complexity of the ﬁltering step as 277.5 time and memory.
We recover 3 · 7 + 8 · 8 = 85 bits of of KA (and 85 bits of KC) with 299.5 data
and time and 277.5 memory.
The remaining part of the key can be found with many approaches. One is
to relax the condition on one of the active S-boxes in round 3 thus getting four
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more active S-boxes in round 2, which in turn leads to a full-diﬀerence state
in round 1. The condition can be actually relaxed only for the ﬁrst part of the
boomerang (the key pair (KA,KB)) thus giving a better output ﬁlter. For each
candidate quartet we use the key bytes, that were recovered at the previous
step, to compute ΔA1 and thus signiﬁcantly reduce the number of keys that are
proposed by a quartet. We then rank candidates for the ﬁrst four columns of
K0A and take the candidate that gets the maximal number of votes. Since we
do not make key guesses, we expect that the complexity of this step is smaller
than the complexity of the previous step (299.5). The right quartet also provide
information about four more bytes in the right half of K0A that correspond to
the four active S-boxes in round 2. The remaining 8 bytes of KA can be found
by exhaustive search.
6 Attack on AES-192
The key schedule of AES-192 has better diﬀusion, so it is hard to avoid active S-
boxes in the subkeys. We construct a related-key boomerang attack with two sub-
trails of 6 rounds each. The attack is an ampliﬁed-boomerang attack because we
have to deal with truncated diﬀerences in both the plaintext and the ciphertext,
the latter would be expensive to handle in a plain boomerang attack.
6.1 The Trail
The trail is depicted in Figure 8, and the actual values are listed in Tables 4
and 5. The key schedule codeword is depicted in Figure 6.
Table 4. Internal state diﬀerence in the AES-192 trail
ΔP
? ? 3e ?
1f 1f ? 1f
1f 1f 1f ?
? 21 21 21
ΔA1
1f ? 00 1f
00 00 ? 00
00 00 00 ?
? 00 00 00
ΔA2
00 1f 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
ΔA3
00 1f 1f 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
ΔA4
00 00 00 1f
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
ΔA5
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
ΔA6
00 1f 1f 1f
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
ΔA7
00 00 00 1f
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
∇A6
1f 1f 1f 1f
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
∇A7
00 00 1f 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
∇A8
1f 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
∇A9
1f 1f 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
∇A10
00 00 1f 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
∇A11
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
∇A12
? ? ? ?
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
ΔC
? ? ? ?
1f 1f 1f 1f
1f 1f 1f 1f
? ? ? ?
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Table 5. Key schedule diﬀerence in the AES-192 trail
ΔK0
00 3e 3e 3f 3e 01
00 1f 1f 1f 1f 00
00 1f 1f 1f 1f 00
? 21 21 21 21 00
ΔK1
00 3e 00 3f 01 00
00 1f 00 1f 00 00
00 1f 00 1f 00 00
00 21 00 21 00 00
ΔK2
00 3e 3e 01 00 00
00 1f 1f 00 00 00
00 1f 1f 00 00 00
00 21 21 00 00 00
ΔK3
00 3e 00 01 01 01
00 1f 00 00 00 00
00 1f 00 00 00 00
00 21 00 00 00 00
ΔK4
00 3e 3e 3f 3e 3f
00 1f 1f 1f 1f 1f
00 1f 1f 1f 1f 1f
? ? ? ? ? ?
∇K0
? ? ? 3e 3f 3e
? ? ? 1f 1f 1f
? ? ? 1f 1f 1f
? ? ? ? 21 21
∇K1
? ? 3f 01 3e 00
? ? 1f 00 1f 00
? ? 1f 00 1f 00
? ? ? 00 21 00
∇K2
? 3e 01 00 3e 3e
? 1f 00 00 1f 1f
? 1f 00 00 1f 1f
? ? 00 00 21 21
∇K3
3e 00 01 01 3f 01
1f 00 00 00 1f 00
1f 00 00 00 1f 00
? 00 00 00 21 00
∇K4
3e 3e 3f 3e 01 00
1f 1f 1f 1f 00 00
1f 1f 1f 1f 00 00
21 21 21 21 00 00
∇K5
3e 00 3f 01 00 00
1f 00 1f 00 00 00
1f 00 1f 00 00 00
21 00 21 00 00 00
∇K6
3e 3e 01 00 00 00
1f 1f 00 00 00 00
1f 1f 00 00 00 00
21 21 00 00 00 00
∇K7
3e 00 01 01 01 01
1f 00 00 00 00 00
1f 00 00 00 00 00
21 00 00 00 00 00
∇K8
3e 3e 3f 3e 3f 3e
1f 1f 1f 1f 1f 1f
1f 1f 1f 1f 1f 1f













Fig. 6. AES-192 key schedule codeword
Related Keys. We deﬁne the relation between four keys similarly to the attack
on AES-256. Assume we are given a key KA, which the attacker tries to ﬁnd.
We compute its subkey K1A and apply the diﬀerence ΔK
1 to get the subkey K1B,
from which the key KB is computed. Then we compute the subkeys K4A and
K4B and apply the diﬀerence ∇K4 to them. We get subkeys K4C and K4D, from
which the keys KC and KD are computed.
Now we prove that keys KA, KB, KC , and KD form a quartet, i.e. the subkeys
of KC and KD satisfy the equations K lC⊕K lD = ΔK l, l = 1, 2, 3. The only active
S-box is positioned between K3 and K4, whose input is k30,5. However, this



















































































Fig. 7. AES-256 E0 and E1 trails. Green ovals show an overlap between the two trails
where the switch happens.















































































Fig. 8. AES-192 trail
16 A. Biryukov and D. Khovratovich
S-box gets the same pair of inputs in both key pairs (see the “Feistel switch” in
Sec. 4.2). Indeed, if we compute ∇k30,5 from ΔK4, then it is equal to Δk30,5 =
0x01. Therefore, if the active S-box gets as input α and α ⊕ 1 in KA and KB,
respectively, then it gets a ⊕ 1 and a in KC and KD, respectively. As a result,
K3C ⊕ K3D = ΔK3, the further propagation is linear, so the four keys form
a quartet.
Due to a slow diﬀusion in the backward direction, we can compute some values
in ∇K l even for small l (Table 5). Hence given kli,j for KA we can partly compute
KB, KC and KD, which provides additional ﬁltration in the attack.







c , the dif-
ference in the other six bytes not restricted. The three active S-boxes in rounds
2–4 are passed with probability 2−6 each. In round 6 (the switching round) we
ask for the ﬁxed diﬀerence only in a60,2, the other two S-boxes can output any
diﬀerence such that it is the same as in the second related-key pair. Therefore,
the ampliﬁed probability of round 6 equals to 2−6−2·3.5 = 2−13. We switch be-
tween the two trails before the key addition in round 6 in all bytes except b60,2,
where we switch after the S-box application in round 7 (the Ladder switch). This
trick allows us not to take into account the only active S-box in the lower trail
in round 7. The overall probability of the rounds 3–6 is 2−3·6−13 = 2−31.
The lower trail has 8 active S-boxes in rounds 8–12. Only the ﬁrst four active
S-boxes are restricted in the output diﬀerence, which gives us probability 2−24
for the lower trail. The ciphertext diﬀerence is fully speciﬁed in the middle two
rows, and has 35 bits of entropy in the other bytes. More precisely, each ∇c0,∗ is
taken from a set of size 27, and all the ∇c3,∗ should be the same on both sides
of the boomerang and again should belong to a set of size 27. Therefore, the
ciphertext diﬀerence gives us a 93-bit ﬁlter.
6.2 The Attack







c with 248 texts each. Then we encrypt
all the texts with the keys KA and KC , and their complements w.r.t. ΔP on
KB and KD. We keep all the data in memory and analyze it with the following
procedure:
1. Compose all candidate plaintext pairs for the key pairs (KA,KB) and
(KC ,KD).
2. Compose and store all the candidate quartets of the ciphertexts.
3. For each guess of the subkey bytes: k00,3, k02,3, and k00,5 in KA; k70,5 in KA
and KB:
(a) Derive values for these bytes in all the keys from the diﬀerential trail.
Derive the yet unknown key diﬀerences in ΔK0 and ∇K8.
(b) Filter out candidate quartets that contradict ∇K8.
(c) Prepare counters for the yet unknown subkey bytes that correspond to
active S-boxes in the ﬁrst two rounds and in the last round: k00,0, k
0
0,1,
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k01,2, k
0








0,3 — in keys KA and
KB, i.e. 16 bytes in total.
(d) For each candidate quartet derive possible values for these unknown
bytes and increase the counters.
(e) Pick the group of 16 subkey bytes with the maximal number of votes.
(f) Try all possible values of the yet unknown 9 key bytes in K0 and check
whether it is the right key. If not then go to the ﬁrst step.
Right quartets. Let us ﬁrst count the number of right quartets in the data.
Evidently, there exist 2128 pairs of internal states with the diﬀerence ΔA2.
The inverse application of 1.5 rounds maps these pairs into structures that we
have deﬁned, with 248 pairs per structure. Therefore, each structure has 248
pairs that pass 1.5 rounds, and 273 structures have 2121 pairs. Of these pairs
2(121−31)·2−128 = 252 right quartets can be composed after the switch in the
middle. Of these quartets 252−2·24 = 16 right quartets come out of the last round.
Now we brieﬂy describe the attack. Full details will be published in the ex-
tended version. In steps 1 and 2 we compose 2152 candidate quartets. The guess
of ﬁve key bytes gives a 32-bit ﬁlter in step 3, so we leave with 2120 candidate
quartets, which are divided according to ∇c3,0 into 214 groups. Then we perform
key ranking in each group and recover 16 more key bytes. The exhaustive search
for the remaining 9 key bytes can be done with the complexity 272. The overall
time complexity is about 2176, and the data complexity is 2123.
7 Conclusions
We presented related-key boomerang attacks on the full AES-192 and the full
AES-256. The diﬀerential trails for the attacks are based on the idea of ﬁnding
local collisions in the block cipher. We showed that optimal key-schedule trails
should be based on low-weight codewords in the key schedule. We also exploit
various boomerang-switching techniques, which help us to gain free rounds in
the middle of the cipher. However, both our attacks are still mainly of theoretical
interest and do not present a threat to practical applications using AES.
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Disclaimer on colors. We intensively use colors in our ﬁgures in order to
provide better understanding on the trail construction. In ﬁgures, diﬀerent colors
refer to diﬀerent values, which is hard to depict in black and white. However,
we also list all the trail diﬀerences in the tables, so all the color information is
actually dubbed.
Trail details. By ΔAi we denote the upper trail diﬀerence in the internal state
after the S-box layer, and by ∇Ai the same for the lower trail.
